Applications/ClamXav.app/Contents/MacOS/ClamXav Applications/avast!.app/Contents/MacOS/avast! Applications/iAntiVirus/iAntiVirus.app/Contents/MacOS/iAntiVirus Applications/VirusBarrier X6.app/Contents/MacOS/VirusBarrier X6 The main malicious library Preferences.dylib won't be used to perform malicious tasks if one of the following files is found in the system: It is also worth mentioning that the backdoor can receive additional commands from the server. It performs backdoor tasks in the system and executes commands received from numerous remote control centers. ![]() When it is completed, the package is deleted and instead the main malicious component Preferences dylib is installed into /Library/Preferences/. If they agree to update, a chain of redirections brings up a prompt to download and install an archive containing the FlashPlayer-11-macos.pkg file (this file is downloaded only if the target operating system is Mac OS X Lion). When a user visits a site distributing malicious software, a flash player error message appears on the screen and then the user is prompted to upgrade their Adobe Flash software. Besides, it is the first malware of this kind for Mac OS that spreads on such a wide scale and implements a sophisticated scheme to spread and maintain bots.īackDoor.Flashback’s installer is disguised as an Adobe Flash Player installer. However, unlike its predecessors such as BackDoor.Olyx it has complex architecture and incorporates a variety of features. The new threat dubbed BackDoor.Flashback is a unique multi-component backdoor targeting computers manufactured by Apple.īackDoor.Flashback is a fourth known backdoor program for Mac OS. The vendor checks the vulnerabilites again.Doctor Web-a leading Russian anti-virus vendor-warns users about a new malicious program for Mac OS. Įvery normal user can start a "normal scan", which includes the system-, library- an program-folders and the folders of every user. ![]() If the first user is a normal user, it sometimes works for the admin as second user, but not every time. If the first user is an admin, this seems to work for every normal user. ![]() If he copies some malware on the system, this disappears without any warning: OnGuard is active and moves the files in the quarantine, but doesn't inform the user about this. If OnGuard is on and another user logs in, it seems as if OnGuard is off. OnGuard does only protect one user (or perhaps a few more).Every user can restore the files of every other user, included the adminĪ normal user can restore quarantined malware in other accounts, tested with the iWorks-Trojan, which was installed by the admin and restored by a normal user.Īdditional, the history-function contains no information about the user which performs an action and can erased by every user. No user-restrictions in the quarantine-managementĪll quarantined files are managed in the same area.Perhaps it's possible to evade the virus-protection. The scanner, OnGuard and the quarantine-management are unable to work with files with several special chars in it, for example ƒ, which is transformed to Æ.įalse-positives are lost, since it's impossible to restore them. Problems with special chars in filenames.It's possible to run malware from the mounted diskimage (tested with MacSmurf, which iAntiVirus recognizes as '') dmg-diskimages is only recognized during a manual scan of the mounted image. sit-archives is recognized by OnGuard during manuel decompression, but malware in. It's possible to download malware from the internet or to copy it from an usb-stick without interruption from iAntiVirus. The scan-function and the online-scanner OnGuard doesn't scan. Tested on german Mac OS X 10.5 with following preferences: Multiple Vulnerabilities in iAntiVirus Program Multiple Vulnerabilities in iAntiVirus Multiple Vulnerabilities in iAntiVirus Title
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